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Evidence from the Italian Government’s E-Procurement Platform
Summary
Participation of small businesses in the market for public contracts is widely recognized
as a key policy issue. It is also commonly held that the adoption of e-procurement
solutions can be effective in pursuing such an objective. To this end, we analyze the
transactions completed in the period 2004-2007 through the Italian Government’s eprocurement platform, that is, the marketplace managed by the Italian Public
Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.). Although descriptive statistics indicate that micro
suppliers are the most represented group of firms in the marketplace, our econometric
treatment provides some evidence that the former are less successful than all other
suppliers in getting public contracts. Degree of loyalty with buyers, location and the use
of other MEPA negotiation tools, also emerge as relevant factors of success in the eprocurement market.
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1. Introduction
E-procurement is increasingly recognized as an effective tool to reduce purchasing costs and
streamline processes in both private and public2 sector. According to the European
Commission’s estimates, “if online procurement is generalised, it can allow governments to
save up to 5% on expenditure and up to 50-80% on transaction costs for both buyers and
suppliers”.3
The recent trend of demand aggregation (that is, centralization) in public procurement –
witnessed by the several central purchasing bodies created in the early 2000 in Europe and in
the U.S. – is often accompanied by a more intensive use of e-procurement.4 Coupling
centralization with e-procurement may, in fact, improve the efficiency of procurement
processes (Somasundaram, 2004). Well designed e-procurement strategies, moreover, are able
to soften potentially adverse effects of centralization – such as hampering smaller firms’
access to the procurement markets – and therefore can encourage full participation of all firms
in the competition for public contracts. One of the most pressing issues in the political agenda
is indeed to reconcile (increased efficiency from) demand aggregation with a more extensive
participation of smaller firms.5
After Consip S.p.A. (Consip henceforth) was mandated by the Italian Government to operate
as a central procurement agency in 2000, Italy has been among the first countries in Europe to
raise the challenge, seeking for the most effective ways to pursue at the same time a greater
demand aggregation and participation of smaller firms in the procurement market. The
Governments’ e-procurement platform (the Italian acronym being MEPA), launched in 2003,
is arguably the most important e-procurement tool designed so far. By exploiting the benefits
of web-based/internet procurement, Consip took the role of a “market maker”, by setting up
an e-marketplace for acquisitions below the EU threshold.6 The Marketplace connects
thousands of public bodies (PBs), both at a central and local level, distributed all over the
Italian territory with a currently large set of micro and small, but also medium and large
suppliers. Public bodies and suppliers have today access to a free trading platform – an “open
market” – populated by many potential sellers/buyers other than those usually present in each
geographical area.
2

In the EU, the possibility for public administrations to use electronic procurement systems was formalized by
the European Directive 18/2004 (Point 12 of introduction).
3
See the EU “Action plan for the implementation of the legal framework for electronic public procurement”
(2004). See also Moon (2005) for a discussion on the determinants of e-procurement in centralized systems.
4
Empirical evidence from Moon (2005) suggests that centralization is one of the main determinants of the
diffusion of e-procurement. See Dimitri, Dini and Piga (2006) for a more detailed discussion of centralization
trends in public (and private) procurement. See also Carpinenti, Piga and Zanza (2006) for an overview of
central procurement agenciess in Europe, in the U.S. and the more recent patterns in Latin America.
5
In the U.S., for instance, the Small Business Act (SBA) in the U.S. promotes full participation of small firms in
the federal (and non-federal) public procurement market. It also monitors that public agencies achieve the setaside objectives set by the law.
6
€137.000 is the threshold for supply and services.
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The Marketplace enables PBs to purchase directly from e-catalogues of qualified suppliers or
to compare products and prices by making Requests for Quotations (RFQs). In 2007, the
volume of all purchases completed through the MEPA since its launch in 2003 achieved €160
Millions. Pushed also by recent legislative modifications7 – that made the use of the
Marketplace compulsory for central public bodies – the MEPA is playing a key role in the
Italian public e-procurement scenario, absorbing about 80% of annual e-catalogue-based
transactions of all Italian PBs.8
After five years of activity, the level of development of the MEPA allows us to open the
“black box” and start analyzing what has happened, especially in terms of structure of the
supply and characteristics of most active suppliers. Looking at available data concerning
RFQs, transactions appear rather concentrated in the hands of a restricted pool of suppliers.
Despite concentration, data exhibit a great dispersion in the number of awarded contracts.
This is essentially due to the fact that, despite active bidding, about 25% of suppliers is never
awarded a contract, while the top 1% accounts for more than 20%.9 One issue worth
addressing is indeed the identification of the characteristics of this set of “top suppliers” and,
symmetrically, what factors affect the low or non-success of many other suppliers. In more
general terms, we look at the determinants of suppliers’ success in the MEPA. In answering
this question we will also be able to investigate whether (and in what direction) firm’s size is
a relevant characteristics for success, therefore providing some insights on the effective role
of the MEPA in promoting the inclusion of smaller firms in the market for low-value public
contracts.
To this end, we analyze a unique, large sample of 3.360 RFQs completed in the Marketplace
during the period 2004-2007. Basic descriptive statistics show that “micro” suppliers, defined
as those with at most 9 employees, are arguably the most represented group of firms in the
Marketplace, absorbing 61% of RFQs and 42% of the volume of the overall transactions.
However, when controlling for i) bidding for a RFQ, ii) location, iii) revenue and iv) other
characteristics, the picture appears rather different. Measuring suppliers’ performance with
the frequency of awarded contracts (Y) over the sample period, estimations suggest that the
predicted value of Y varies with the firm’s size in a direction that is not in favour of the
smallest suppliers (i.e., micro suppliers). Most performing suppliers are non-micro suppliers
(small, medium and large) based in the North, more inclined to serve a selected pool of
purchasing PBs. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) appear as performing as large
suppliers. Micro suppliers are, instead, significantly less performing than all other suppliers.

7

This is due to the recent Italian Financial Law for the 2008.
See the final Report of the Osservatorio B2B - Politecnico di Milano, for an analysis of e-procurement in the
Italian Public Sector (www.osservatori.net).
9
Henceforth we will use RFQ and contract interchangeably.
8
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Location, size and degree of loyalty with buyers emerge therefore as relevant factors
explaining performance.
Descriptive statistics also suggest that public bodies located in historically less developed
areas tend to award a large fraction of contracts to non-local suppliers. Public bodies tend to
purchase from non-local suppliers only if these are more efficient or more able to fit their
needs. One possible explanation of this finding is that the efficiency advantage of non-local
suppliers more that compensate higher transaction/transportation costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first survey the economic literature on eprocurement and e-platforms. In Section 3 we describe the MEPA’s institutional/legal
framework and stated goals. Section 4 is dedicated to the evolution and the performance of
the MEPA in the period 2004-2007, with focus on the dynamics of transactions, volumes, and
registered users (demand side). In Section 5 we look in more detail at the supply side, in terms
of number, and size and performance of suppliers. After a brief description of the estimation
methodologies, Section 6 presents the results on the determinants of suppliers’ performance.
Section 7 concludes.

2. Related Literature
To our knowledge this is the first paper that investigates empirically policy issues in the field
of public e-procurement. Most of the economic and business research on e-procurement is
concentrated on popular online platforms such as the one of eBay and Amazon. These
marketplaces are today well developed. In the last ten years, they have been providing
theorists with puzzling phenomena to ruminate, and econometricians with valuable data to
analyze, IT experts/engineers with ideal environments to study technological evolutions and
applications for e-commerce. B2G and other public e-procurement marketplaces, instead,
have been launched only recently by public authorities.10 Economic research in this area is
therefore only at its infancy. Nonetheless, economists and e-business researchers have already
started addressing important issues. Some of the most fertile fields of research are across
economics and business. One is the relationships between e-procurement and centralization
(Somasundaram 2004, Subramaniam and Shaw 2003, and Neef 2001). Another field is the
determinants of e-procurement (Moon, 2005). Dimitri, Dini and Piga (2006) present a survey
on these topics.
Despite the economic literature on e-platforms being very recent, research has already
produced insightful results. Most theoretical research relates to the field of “two-sided

10

Some of the most important public e-platforms in the USA, such as Myflorida Marketplace and North
Carolina@yourservice, were built up in 2002-2003. Consip itself was activated at the end of 2003. See Caripenti,
Piga and Zanza (2006) for a benchmarking on public e-procurement platforms.
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markets”. In this field, researchers have mainly focused on two main issues known as the
“chicken and egg problem” (Armstrong 2006, Gaudeul and Jullien 2001, Rochet and Tirole,
2004, and Jullien 2005), and “competiting e-platforms” (Caillaud and Jullien 2003, and
Rochet and Tirole 2003). The empirical literature on e-procurement focuses mainly on big
B2B platforms for which valuable data are available. Most papers look at the issue of price
formation in e-auctions (such as the ones performed by eBay and Amazon) and the effects of
online reputation/feedback mechanisms on participation and bidding behaviour. The role of
online feedback mechanisms has also been extensively analyzed. Jullien (2006), Dellarocas
(2007) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) provide extensive surveys on the topic.

3. MEPA: The Institutional Context
Italy was one the first EU countries to adopt an e-procurement regulation. With the
Presidential Decree No. 101/2002 the Italian Government introduced the use of digital
procedures in public procurement allowing the Italian public sector to perform acquisitions
below the EU threshold through the Public Administration Marketplace. The MEPA was
created to promote electronic-based procurement and to streamline purchasing processes.
More generally, it aims at “updating” the culture and the practice of public purchasing
management.
The MEPA is conceived, at its core, as a complementary tool with the set of framework
contracts that Consip awardes on behalf of PBs for acquisitions above the EU threshold.11
Very often small firms12 cannot handle high-value framework contracts, usually resulting
from demand aggregation of many PBs.13 As a result, the Italian policy makers created the
MEPA in order to have micro and SMEs in a better position to be awarded public contracts
below the EU threshold.
The Marketplace is open to qualified suppliers according to non-restrictive selection criteria.
After qualification, suppliers' catalogues are uploaded into the MEPA, displayed in a
dedicated web site and thus made available to the entire community. Suppliers can provide a
non-binding geographical area of coverage for their business. Catalogues are presented in a
standardized template in order to make easier for PBs the evaluation of different products.
Any PB freely registers to the Marketplace, browses catalogues, compares products and
11

Since 2000 Consip operates as a central public procurement station for the acquisition of goods and services
(works are excluded),
12
Hereforth, we will use firms and suppliers interexchangeably.
13
The idea that big framework contracts represent an entry barrier to participation of smaller firms is a widely
accepted view. However, empirical evidence supporting or confuting this is to our knowledge absent. First
evidence of this effect are in Albano, Dini, Zampino (2008) who empirically test the relationship between
participation and contract value in the context of IT services contracts awarded by a large public buyer. Results
indicate that large contract value discourage participation and at the same time favours joint bidding.
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prices, makes requests for quotation or purchases directly from e-catalogues. The entire
transaction process is digital, supported by digital signature in order to ensure legal
compliance and overall transparency of process. Figure 1 provides a conceptual scheme of the
Marketplace. The MEPA is not fee free. Business is financed through the Ministry of
Economy and Finance’s (MEF) transfers to Consip.
Potential advantages to PBs would include:
•

reduction of purchasing and transaction costs;

•

development of human capital;

•

broadening of suppliers base;

•

enhanced transparency and ease of comparison among different goods/services;

•

purchases logging and subsequent expenditure monitoring.

Potential advantages for suppliers include:
•

selling cost reduction (due to broadening of potential customers base, lower
intermediation costs and free digital platform);

•

major visibility with respect to the span of PBs;

•

B2G introduction in addition to existing B2B and B2C.

•

extending the platform of potential buyers.
Figure 1 - MEPA: the conceptual scheme

3.1. E-procurement tools in the MEPA
Public bodies can purchase goods and services on the MEPA by means of two alternative
tools:
•

Direct Purchase (DP);

• Request for Quotation (RFQ).
The DP allows the PB to buy directly from the e-catalogue at a pre-fixed (i.e., posted) price. It
is usually adopted to purchase very low-value items. It can also be suitable when the PB
needs to satisfy urgent needs thus avoiding delays generated by a competitive procedure. The

6
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RFQ is a competitive selection procedure through which the PB solicits all qualified14 or a
certain group of suppliers to submit a tender. Responding suppliers provide both a price
quotation and the details of technical/quality improvements when required. The contract is
awarded to the most preferred price-quality combination without using an explicit, that is,
publicly announced, scoring rule. Thus PBs have some discretionary power in awarding
RFQs. Contracts may be awarded to a supplier who is not first in the price ranking of the
product but, for instance, offers valuable services that are not offered by other suppliers (e.g.,
fast shipping) or is able to deliver it at lower costs. A RFQ is then conceived as a way to
introduce some degrees of competition in the acquisition of relatively more valued
product/services.

4. Evolution of the MEPA in the period 2004-2007.
At the end of 2007 the MEPA achieved the following results: 1.250 registered Purchasing
Units (PUs)15, more than 52.000 transactions (including both RFQs and DPs), for a total value
of about €160 Millions (see Table 1). In 2007, all business indicators improved considerably.
Transaction volumes doubled with respect to 2006 and the number of transactions became 2.5
time the value of 2006. The exponential growth of the last year is also due to the 2007 Italian
Financial Law that made compulsory the use of MEPA for some PBs (mainly central
government). The average value per transaction was €2.640 in 2004 and 2.969. In the sample
period 2004-2007 the average value increased up to €3.048 (+15%).
Tab. 1 – Number of Transactions and values (2004-2007)16
Year

2004

2005

2006

2007

Cumulative

Transactions
Millions of €

3.143
8,3

9.675
29,90

11.467
38,04

28.168
83,64

52.453
159,88

Table 2 illustrates the evolution of PU registrations to the marketplace. Registrations have
been steadily growing over the three years. In early February 2008, PUs were almost 5.900,
with an increase of about 457% with respect to 2004. One important indicator is the growth of
“active” PUs. A PU is defined active if it has purchased at least once in the current year.
Active users were 1.097 in December 2005, 1.253 in 2006. In 2007, they achieved 2.726
(+118% over 2006): about 50% of registered PUs adopted the MEPA for at least one
purchase.
14

That is, all suppliers that were qualified to sell the category of products included in the RFQ.
Purchasing Units are departments, structures or other units belonging to the same public body. The Purchasing
Unit is the lowest level of authority endowed with "budget power" in the Italian Public Administration.
16
Source: Bertini L. and A. Vidoni (2007).
15
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“Loyals”, namely those users who have bought at least once in the current and in the previous
year, were 600 in 2006 and 714 in 2007. However, in 2007 the share of loyal PUs over active
(714/2726) is 26%. In 2007 the fraction of loyal over active halved with respect to 2006. This
is because the number of registrations increased significantly and much more than the
“loyals” because of the new rules making the MEPA compulsory for central bodies.
Tab. 2 - Purchasing Units in the period 2004-2007
Registered
Cumulative
Registered
Active
Loyal
New Entry

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008 (10/02)

1.288

1.038

601

2.185

228

1.288

2.326

2.927

5.653

5.888

-

1.097
-

1.253
600
653

2.726
714
2.012

-

On the supply side, 1.293 (active) suppliers are registered in the MEPA, accounting for a total
of 2050 e-catalogues (as of January 2008)17. ICT and office supplies represent a large fraction
of total catalogues (78%) as reported in Table 3.
Tab. 3 - Distribution of catalogues for supplies, 2008.
At January 2008: 1.293 Stayers; 2050 catalogues uploaded
ICT

Office

Services

Health materials

Others

43.5%

34.5%

14%

1%

7%

5. The supply side: basic statistics
Before investigating the determinants of suppliers’ performance we provide an overview of
the supply side of the MEPA. We look in more detail at the information contained in the large
sample of transactions drawn from MEPA in the period 01/2004-05/2007. This period does
not include transactions made under the regime of compulsory introduced by the Financial
Law 2008.18
Table 4 reports a summary of the sample data. We focus our attention on purchases performed
through RFQs. There are several reasons to have a closer look at RFQs rather than DPs:
•

17
18

they explain the greater part of total transaction volume (65%);

Source: internal reporting system.
The obligation to use the MEPA is after July 1st, 2007.
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•

by looking at direct purchases we only observe the selling supplier (who is committed
to sell at a predetermined price that is posted in the e-catalogue), whereas the analysis
of RFQs reveals how and when all invited suppliers respond and, most importantly,
who are most successful suppliers;

•

the use of discretionary power by PUs may reveal the latter’s purchasing
patterns/preferences.
Tab. 4 – Summary of the sample (January 2004 – May 2007).
Volume

%

N. transactions

%

Average value

RFQ

€ 50.557.040

65%

3.360

14%

€ 15.046,74

DP

€ 26.997.540

35%

20.188

86%

€ 1.337,31

Total

€ 77.554.580

100%

23.548

100%

€ 3.293,47

The dataset comprises detailed information on 3.360 RFQs and 1.351 invited suppliers. 1053
suppliers are invited to provide quotations for a “single” category of supply (e.g., ICT). 281
out of 1053 suppliers were invited to submit proposals for a “bundle” of supplies , 50% of
which regarded the bundle ICT + office materials). 425 out of 1053 placed a bid after PUs
invitation. Table 5 shows the distribution of suppliers by dimension as measured by the
number of employees.19
Table 5-6 report that micro suppliers are 54% of total active suppliers in our sample, covering
61% of awarded RFQ and 42% of total transaction volume. Total transaction volume declines
with size. Micro suppliers’ volume is 7 times higher than large suppliers’ (Figure 2).
However, the average value of awarded contracts increases with the supplier’s size (Figure 3).
This suggests that small suppliers are awarded many low-value RFQs, while larger suppliers
are awarded few but larger RFQs.
Tab. 5 - Distribution of suppliers (01/2004-05/2007)
Firm Size

Freq.

Percentage

Cum.

Micro

529

53.87

53.87

Small

287

29.23

83.10

Medium

103

10.49

93.58

Large

63

6.42

100.00

Total

982

100.00

19

Since we do not have data on revenues and on participation/control, the classification by size is only based on
the number of employees. We use the EUROSTAT classification: micro [0-9], small [10-49], medium [50-249]
and large [≥250].

9
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Tab. 6 - Distribution of RFQs by suppliers’ size
Size

N. of awarded RFQ

Average value of awarded RFQ

2060
(61,3%)
850
(25,4%)
361
(10,7%)

Micro
Small
Medium

Total Value of
awarded RFQ
€ 21.098.232
(41,8%)
€ 15.546.192
(30,7%)
€ 10.713.869
(21,2%)

€ 10.241,9
€ 18.289,6
€ 29.678,3

Large

89
(2,6%)

€ 35.940,9

€ 3.198.747
(6,3%)

Overall

3.360

€ 15.046,7

€ 50.557.040

Figure 2 – Distribution of awarded RFQ value by suppliers’ size
Total Value of awarded RFQ
€ 60.000.000
€ 50.000.000
€ 40.000.000
€ 30.000.000
€ 20.000.000
€ 10.000.000
€0
Micro

Small

Medium

Large

Overall

Total Value of awarded RFQ

Figure 3 – Distribution of RFQ average value by suppliers size
€ 40.000,00
€ 35.000,00
€ 30.000,00
€ 25.000,00
€ 20.000,00
€ 15.000,00
€ 10.000,00
€ 5.000,00
€ 0,00
Micro

Small

Medium

Large

Overall

Average value of awarded RFQ

Table 7 reports the distribution of firms by size and localization. Several things are worth
noting. Suppliers located in the North are the ones most present into to the MEPA for any
given size: 35%, 49%, 53% and 43%, respectively from small size towards large size. Micro,
small and medium suppliers represent 85% of total firms. Micro firms are the most
represented in all geographical areas (ranging from 45% to 74%).

10
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Northern regions “contribute” more to suppliers participation, but this contribution is more
focused on medium/large suppliers. Overall, the presence of medium-large and very large
firms is modest and rather concentrated in the more developed areas of the country (Center
and North-West). These numbers suggest that the MEPA seems to achieve its important target
of “hosting” a large number of micro and small suppliers.
Tab. 7 – Firms’ area vs. firms’ size
Suppliers’ Size
Suppliers' location

micro

Small

Medium

large

Total

82

32

13

312

21

2

4

103

56

20

8

156

86

35

19

254

42

14

7

145

0

0

12

12

287

103

63

982

185
(59%)
76
(74%)
72
(46%)
114
(45%)
82
(56%)
0
529
(53,8%)

Center
Islands
North-East
North-West
South
n.a.
Total

In table 8, we match localization of suppliers with that of PUs. We thus obtain a sort of
“regional business balance”. The North is the area awarding the highest fraction of contracts
(through RFQs) to local suppliers (approx. 74%). It is interesting noting, however, that
Southern regions and Islands are those most purchasing from non-local suppliers, 27% and
32%, respectively.
Tab. 8 - Business Balance (awarded RFQs from 01/2004 until 05/2007).
Suppliers' location (Italy)
PUs' location

Center

Islands

North

South

n.a.

Total

Center

1.085

46

738

86

2

1.957

(55.4%)

(2.4%)

(37.7%)

(4.4%)

(0.1%)

(100.0%)

107

147

159

44

4

461

(23.2%)

(31.9%)

(34.5%)

(9.5%)

(0.9%)

(100.0%)

263

25

907

27

9

1.231

(21.4%)

(2.0%)

(73.7%)

(2.2%)

(0.7%)

(100.0%)

150

24

224

156

1

555

(27.0%)

(4.3%)

(40.4%)

(28.1%)

(0.2%)

(100.0%)

1.605

242

2.028

313

16

4.204

(38.2%)

(5.8%)

(48.2%)

(7.4%)

(0.4%)

(100.0%)

Islands

North

South

Total
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http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper208

12

Albano et al.: The Determinants of Suppliers Performance in E-Procurement:

6. Suppliers’ performance
Plot 1 and Table 9 show the frequency distribution of RFQs among suppliers (number of
suppliers on y-axis for given number of awarded RFQs on x-axis). Two things are worth
noting: dispersion and concentration. Out of 425 “interested” suppliers, namely those who
placed at least a bid, roughly 90 were awarded no contract, while 3 suppliers were awarded
more than 100 RFQs. While 20% of suppliers is awarded no RFQs and 50% of them are
awarded just 2 RFQs, the “top” 25% is awarded the largest fraction of the contracts. Although
the average number of RFQs is 7.9, variance is extremely large (453.5). The frequency of
suppliers declines with the number of awarded contracts. On the one hand, data indicate that
many suppliers competing in the market for RFQs are completely unsuccessful. On the other
side, data also indicate that RFQs are rather concentrated in the hand of few suppliers (the
first 25%, roughly 106) among which 4 suppliers (1%) are awarded the 20% of total RFQ
(693/3.360),20 with 3 out of them experiencing outstanding performance (much above 100
RFQs each).
Our main goal is to identify the characteristics of “top 25%”. To this end, we exploit
information on suppliers’ characteristics (such as size, location, loyalty, revenue from the
MEPA etc.) that preliminary statistics seem to indicate as the most relevant factors in
explaining the differences in the number of awarded contracts.

Tab. 9 – RFQ in percentiles (when RFQ participation >0)21
Percentiles
1% 0
5% 0
10% 0
25% 1
50% 2
75%
90%
95%
99%

6
19
28
85

N. Suppliers
4.25
21.25
42.5
106.25
212.5
318.75
382.5
403.75
420.75

Smallest
0
0
0
0
Largest
86
151
188
268

Obs.
425
Sum of Wgt. 425
Mean
Std. Dev.

7.9
21.29

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

453.5
7.2
71.9

20

See the details on RFQ counts in table 9.
Here, only suppliers who placed a bid after invitation to quote from the PU are considered (i.e., participation
>0). The same holds for plot 1.
21
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Plot 1 – Frequency Distribution of RFQs – (participation > 0)
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Plot 2 – Frequency Distribution of RFQs – (RFQ number < 100)
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6.1. Methodology: the Count Data Approach
In many economic environments, the dependent variable of interest is a non-negative integer
or count which the researcher wishes to explain in terms of a set of covariates. With respect to
the classical regression model, the dependent variable (y) is discrete with a distribution that
assigns probability mass at non-negative integer values only (Cameron and Trivedi, 1999).
Standard OLS are no longer feasible to analyze these data. Regression models for counts, as
well as other discrete models such as the logit and probit, become more suitable, as their
properties are strictly connected to discreteness and nonlinearity.
Count data models are appropriate for measuring the “frequency” of occurrence of an event.
A classical example comes from demography, in which fertility is usually modelled as the
number of live births over a given age interval of the mother. The demographer is interested
in analyzing how fertility varies with the mother’s schooling, age, and household income, etc.
Accident analysis studies model airline safety, for example, as measured by the number of
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accidents experienced by an airline over some period, and wishes to examine its relationship
to airline profitability and financial health.
The analysis of frequencies implies controlling for the risk – exposure – that the event may
occur. In the example of fertility, the exposure is the age of the mother, while in the case of
airline accident is the number of flights in the period.22
Count data approach is the most appropriate for our dataset. Our dependent variable is the
number of times (Y) each supplier is awarded an RFQ, so we refer to it as the proxy for his
performance (or success) in the MEPA. Suppliers’ performance is controlled for participation
(exposure) to the RFQ. Exposure is then the number of times each supplier bids for a contract
and, therefore, is exposed to the likelihood of being awarded a contract. That is, while
analyzing the number of times each supplier is awarded a contract we control for the number
of times he bids for an RFQ: winning 10 contracts of course would have a completely
different meaning if bidding occurred 10 times instead of 100 times!
Non-linearity and discreteness are key features of models for count data. Plot 1 clearly
indicates this to be the case for our sample. Models for count data, such as Poisson23 or
Negative Binomial regressions, appropriately account for such features by working with the
logs of dependent, given the original exponential form of independent variables.24 The
Poisson model imposes the restriction that the conditional variance equals the expected value
of the dependent variable E [Y ] = var [Y ] = λ . However, this restriction is often rejected in
economic applications.25 This is our case as shown in table 9: the variance is much greater
than the mean (453.5>7.9), displaying the classic “overdispersion” trouble. In case of
overdispersion, Cameron and Trivedi (1986) suggest to use the Negative Binomial (NB)
regression,26 which relaxes the assumption about mean-variance equality, by including a
22

Applications of such models are quite common in the economic literature. Cameron A.C., P.K. Trivedi, Milne
and Piggott (1988) apply the count data approach to analyze the determinants of the choice of health insurance
type and types of health care services in Australia, using micro-level data from the 1977-78. Other applications
to heath care are due to Cameron and Windmeijer (1996) and Freud, Kniesner and LoSasso (1996, 1998).
23
The Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution that expresses the probability of a number of
events occurring in a fixed period of time (distance, area, etc.) if these events occur with a known average rate
(λ) and independently of the time since the last event.

f y ( y ) = f y ( y; λ ) =

e−λ λ y
for y=0, 1, 2, …; f y ( y ) = f y ( y; λ ) = 0 otherwise.
y!

E [Y / X ] = e X β where E[.] is the expected count of the dependent variable conditional to the vector of
covariates (X) and β is the vector of estimated coefficients. See Greene (2003) for a basic treatment of these
24

models. See also Cameron and Trivedi (1986) and Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for an overview of standard
models for count data.
25
Another assumption in the Poisson regression is that the events must be independent in the sense that the
occurrence of one event will not impact the occurrence probability of another event. We are not able to assess
how much this assumption holds in our case. However, the single RFQ awarding event (per supplier) may be
reasonably thought independent from the outcomes of someone else; if a form of dependence there was, it would
be due to the supplier’s past performance in previous contracts.
26
The Negative Binomial distribution is a discrete probability distribution that expresses the probability of a
number of events occurring in a fixed period of time (distance, area, etc.) according to following distribution
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stochastic term (εi) in the parameter µi, where εi follows a gamma distribution. In the NB
regression, the variance is equal to µ + αµ 2 , where µ is the mean of the dependent variable
and α ≥ 0 is known as the overdispersion parameter. The NB allows the econometrician to
account for some unobserved heterogeneity among individuals that may help explaining
dispersion and model this complex form of heteroskedasticity. Indeed, the term α permits the
form of heteroskedasticity where the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean,
which is prevalent in count data. The NB model collapses into Poisson specification as α
approaches zero.27 The NB model is appropriate to gain consistent estimators even if there is
some heterogeneity in the data. This heterogeneity, however, should not be due to a
permanent unobservable effect. If it was the case, permanent heterogeneity would present
itself as persistent serial correlation in the residuals (Blundell et al., 1995). Furthermore, if
qualitative difference between transition from zero events to the first occurrence and from the
first to further occurrences was reasonably supposed in our data, a more complicated model
specification would need. Green (1994) shows the suitability of zero-inflated models if there
is a two stage process governing occurrences. The former stage would lead to structural
treatment of the binary event between being awarded or not. Fortunately, this is not our case.
In fact, we have at most 20% of zero occurrence on 425 observed suppliers. The Vuong test28
does not support the hypothesis that the excess of zero is a problem in our data.
As shown in the next section, the test does not reject the hypothesis of overdispersion,
suggesting that the NB model is more appropriate for our data. Fitting NB regression is
similar to fitting Poisson regression, therefore the log of the mean µ, is a linear function of
independent variables.
We define the incidence rate (ir) as the average number the event occurred given the times it
could have occurred:
(ir )i =

Count of events
,
N. of times event could have occurred

(1)

where the denominator is the “exposure”. We model the logarithm of the incidence rate as a
linear function of more explanatory variables:
 −r  r
y
 p ( −q ) for y=0, 1, 2, …; f y ( y ) = f y ( y; r , p ) = 0 otherwise; where
 y

function: f y ( y ) = f y ( y; r , p ) = 
the

parameters

var [Y ] =

are

r=1,

2,

3…

and

0 < p ≤1

and

q = 1 − p . Then,

E [Y ] =

rq
=µ
p

and

1
rq
= µ + αµ 2 , assuming α = .
2
r
p

27

NB model is thus a robust generalization of the Poisson.
The computed value is V = 0.50, 0.26 for ZIP and ZINB models, respectively. See Vuong (1989) for details on
this tests.

28
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ln(ir )i = ' xi ⋅ β + ε i .

(2)

Alternatively, the model describes logs of expected event counts:

such as:

ln(expected count)i = ln(exposurei ) + ' xi ⋅ β + ε i ,

(3)

ln( µi ) = ln( N i ) + ' xi ⋅ β + ε i .

(4)

NB regression finds the maximum-likelihood estimates of the β parameters. We recall that:
•

ln(µi)-ln(Ni)=ln(µi/ Ni) is the log of the conditional mean of the number of awarded
contract for each supplier “i”;

•

‘xi is the vector of explanatory variables;

β is the vector of estimated coefficients for each covariate;
• εi is an individual unobserved heterogeneity effect to control for variance. This
•

component plays a double role of measuring both the specification error (as in the
classical linear regression model) or the kind of cross sectional (i.e. cross-suppliers)
heterogeneity.
The vector of explanatory variables is a set of variables capturing the individual
characteristics of suppliers:
•

ln(MEPA_revenue) measures the suppliers’ overall turnover (in terms of natural
logarithm to smooth absolute gaps) realized on the MEPA since their registration on
the platform. This can be a proxy of the size of the supplier in the specific context of
the MEPA. It is computed on the total revenue from both RFQ and DP sales. We
expect this number to be positively correlated with the number of awarded RFQs.

•

DP_Num is the number of direct sales through DPs realized in the sample period.
This variable proxies how performing is the supplier in the other selling tool offered
by the MEPA. The level of performance in DPs may help us to say something about
the suppliers’ performance in RFQs. A positive coefficient indicates that good
performance in DPs may help being performing also in RFQ (RFQ and DP are
somewhat complementary). A negative coefficient might indicate that the supplier is
more specialized in one of the two (the tools may be substitutes).

•

PU_Num: number of different PUs served by each supplier. This variable measures
whether the supplier sells to many different PUs rather than a restricted pool of PUs.
It is the number of unique PUs the supplier interacted with in the sample period,
including both RFQs and DPs. This variable is a proxy for loyalty between suppliers
and PUs, thus measuring whether and how the degree of loyalty impacts suppliers’
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success in being awarded an RFQ. The variable may give some understanding of the
nature of success. A negative correlation means that, all else being equal, success goes
in the same direction of interacting with few PU but repeatedly. A positive
correlations may instead indicate that success goes in the direction of less frequent
interactions, but with many different PUs.
•

Dummy_firm_nord: this dummy equals 1 if the supplier is located in the North of
Italy, 0 otherwise. The dummy captures the contribution of geographical location to
success. As Figure 4 suggests, suppliers located in the North – especially North-East,
the Italian most developed industrial area – appear more successful than those located
in other areas (they experience higher awarding rates, i.e., higher number of awarded
contracts/number of invitations to bid from PUs).

•

Dummy_micro_firm: this dummy equals 1 if the supplier is a micro firm [≤9
employees], 0 otherwise. This dummy variable is constructed following indications
from Figure 5. Micro suppliers are awarded a lower number of contracts with respect
to all other suppliers, while SMEs and large suppliers display comparable success
rates. Awarding rates for micro firms appear much lower with that of all others’ (about
0.2 vs. 0.3).29

•

Dummy_outlier_RFQ: there are 3 suppliers who are awarded a significantly higher
number of RFQs with respect to everyone else (over 100 RFQs each). It can be the
case that these suppliers face with some very specific features that allow them to be
much more performing than all other suppliers, thus we control for this outlier factor.

•

RFQ_Partec: is the exposure variable in our model. This is the number of times each
supplier bid/responded to an invitation to quote from purchasing units. This variable is
not directly included in the estimation of the parameters, however is taken into
appropriate account for its calibration by the estimation procedure.
Figure 4. Awarding rates by firms’ location
Awarded RFQs/Participation ratios by firms' location
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
center

islands

north-east

northwest

south

n.a.

by firms' location

29

The awarding rate is equal to the number of awarded RFQs over the number of times suppliers placed a bid
after the invitation to quote from the PU.
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Figure 5. Awarding rates by firms’ size
Awarded RFQs/Partecipation ratios by firms' size
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
micro

small

medium

large

by firms' size

6.2. Results
In this section we present the results of a number of model specifications in order to check the
robustness of regression analysis. As it is shown in table 10 the Wald test indicates largely
significant coefficients in the model of interest, even if accounting for the variance of awarded
RFQ. The variance is much greater than the mean, therefore, revealing that the distribution of
the dependent variable is clearly affected by considerable overdispersion (this is also
confirmed by likelihood ratio tests).
The large value for χ2 (1034) as goodness-of-fit confirms this conjecture and suggests that the
Poisson distribution is not a good choice for our data.30 However, we first treat overdispersion
by adjusting standard errors with the square root of the Pearson χ2 dispersion (see the second
column of estimations in table 10). The coefficients, identical to the previous analysis, display
standard errors adjusted for the overdispersion in the Poisson model. Coefficients show a
decrease in z-scores, but all keep a very high statistical significance. An alternative solution to
scaling the standard errors would be to use the NB regression, which is usually appropriate as
discussed above. Estimated coefficients still show a reduction in z-scores, but preserve an
appropriate statistical significance. The direction of correlations are confirmed all over the
regression models. Estimation results are reported below in column 3 of table 10.
Estimated coefficients measure how the expected number of awarded RFQ vary as covariates
vary. In particular we can interpret the regression coefficients as a difference between the logs
of expected counts. Formally, this can be written as β = ln( µ x0+1 ) − ln( µ x0 ) , where the subscripts
indicate the points in which the predictor variable x is evaluated (at x0+1 and x0, implying a
 µ x0+1
 µx
 0

one unit change in the predictor variable x). This is equivalent to β = ln 


 , which allows



us to interpret coefficients in terms of the log of the ratio of expected counts. The exposure
The likelihood ratio test for α=0 (table 10, column III) is a test of the over-dispersion parameter α. When this
parameter is zero the negative binomial distribution is equivalent to a Poisson distribution. In the case, α is
significantly different from zero and thus reinforces that Poisson distribution is not appropriate.
30
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term allows us to be more rigours, by interpreting the regression coefficients as the log of the
rate ratio. On the contrary, the IRR β-estimations (see column 5) provides the exact incidence
 µ x0+1
 µx
 0

rate ratios 


 arising from the one unit change in the regressors.



Coefficients indicate that revenue, location, size, loyalty and direct purchases significantly
affect suppliers performance. The estimated predicted number of awarded RFQs is about 1.9
for each supplier on average over the explanatory variables. It is worth noting how this
number varies in response to variation of the independent variables (table 10, column 6).
For instance, being located in the North allows the supplier to increase of 0.517 his expected
number of awarded RFQ that is: roughly +27% (≈0.517/1.919). Being a micro supplier,
however, reduces the number of expected awarded RFQs of 0.31, more or less of 16%.
Indeed, the incidence rate ratios (IRR) show straightforward the effects (intensity, signs and
significance are confirmed overall model specifications) on expected contracts award
occurrences. Revenue also has a sizeable positive impact (+18%). The signs of direct
purchases and the number of different purchasing units are consistent with the expected
directions, despite they show very modest in size (+0.001% and -0.004%, respectively).
The role of firm’s size is somewhat surprising given the preliminary statistics (see table 6)
according to which micro firms absorb 61% of total RFQs. Despite absorbing more than 60%
of RFQ, regressions indicate that micro firms are the least successful suppliers in the MEPA.
One possible explanation for this is that micro suppliers absorb a great part of the transactions
simply because they are statistically more present in the marketplace than all other suppliers.
This might also suggests that each (of the many) micro suppliers is awarded a very limited
number of RFQs.31 Instead, many RFQs are awarded to other, arguably less represented
suppliers.
The variable PU_Num has a negative sign but quite weak impact (-0.004). This suggests the
existence of some loyalty effects in MEPA. The negative sign seems to confirm that suppliers
interacting with a limited number of unique PUs experience an increase in the expected value
of awarded RFQs.32
The log of the overall transaction value (MEPA_revenue) is also largely significant in our
estimations (+0.162) and with positive sign it goes in the direction of higher revenues
associated to higher number of transactions (instead of less transactions of higher value). The
log-log formulation allows us to interpret the coefficient as an elasticity. That is, 1% increase
in revenue is associated to a 16% increase in expected number of awarded contracts.
Suppliers’ transaction value is a proxy for their relative size with respect to the MEPA. HighMEPA revenue suppliers are also more performing than low-MEPA revenue suppliers.
31

Except three micro firms which account for the three largest counts of awarded contracts (over 100 contracts).
It would be interesting investigating casualty effects, i.e., whether is success to drive repeated interactions or
vice-versa.
32
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The number of DPs – the proxy of performance with respect to the alternative MEPA selling
tool – does not seem to influence suppliers’ performance on the RFQ side, although its
significance is kept in the transition between Poisson models to Negative Binomial. However,
this does not necessarily exclude some complementarities between the two as long as the
positive sign is maintained across the different estimation techniques.
Model 4 in table 10 aims at capturing some potential bias effect of the three most successful
suppliers (three suppliers collected over 100 RFQs each). The outlier dummy control,
however, is not significant although the estimates still exhibits robustness.
In summary, evidence suggests that most successful suppliers are non-micro suppliers,
located in the most developed areas of the country (North of Italy), interacting with a limited
(“privileged”) pool of administrations. Interestingly, a non-micro supplier located in the North
is expected to be successful roughly 45% more than micro supplier located in the South.
Revenue from MEPA and good performance on DPs side also arise as additional factors of
success.
Table 10. Estimation of RFQ with alternative count data regression models
RFQ_Num
Ln(MEPA_revenue)

I.
Poisson
Regression
0,142***
(7,94)

RFQ_Number Regressions
II.
III.
IV.
V.
GLM_Poisson
Negative
Negative
Negative
Scaled (x2)
Binomial (1) Binomial (2) Binomial_IRR
0,142***
0,162***
0,162***
1,176***
(4,70)
(5,81)
(5,83)
(5,81)

VI.
Marginal
effects (3)
0,311***
(6,63)

DP_Num

0,001***
(7,86)

0,001***
(4,66)

0,001***
(2,61)

0,001***
(2,81)

1,001***
(2,61)

0,002***
(2,58)

PU_Num

-0,003***
(-7,46)

-0,003***
(-4,42)

-0,004***
(-3,39)

-0,004***
(-3,56)

0,996***
(-3,39)

-0,008***
(-3,35)

Dummy_
Firm_nord

0,366***
(9,69)

0,366***
(5,74)

0,263***
(3,36)

0,256***
(3,26)

1,301***
(3,36)

0,517***
(3,25)

Dummy_
Micro_firm

-0,142***
(-3,67)

-0,142**
(-2,17)

-0,16**
(-1,97)

-0,171**
(-2,10)

0,852**
(-1,97)

-0,31*
(-1,92)

-

-

-

-0,347
(-1,13)

-

-

-3,493***
(-15,82)

-3,493***
(-8,37)

-3,46***
(-10,36)

-3,443***
(-10,33)

-

-

Dummy_
Outlier_RFQ
Constant
RFQ_Partec
Obs.
LR chi2
Pseudo R2
Goodness-of-fit
Chi2
(1/df) Deviance
(1/df) Pearson

exposure = ln(RFQ_Partec)
425
342,44
0,14

425
-

425
64,22
0,036

425
65,56
0,036

425
64,22
0,036

-

1034,17

-

-

-

-

-

-

2,468
2,847

--

--

-

371,22
341,59
371,22
(α=0,201)
(α=0,199)
(α=0,201)
z-scores shown in parentheses; significant levels at *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01.
(x2) Generalized Linear Modeling for Poisson distribution scaled with standard errors using square root of the
Pearson chi-square dispersion, in order to deal with the over-dispersion.
(3) Marginal effects after “nbreg”; y = predicted number of events (1,919) and dy/dx = marginal effects at the
means of the independent variables, also for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
LR-test (α)=0

-

-
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Robustness of our results is confirmed by comparing magnitude and statistical significance of
coefficients under different prediction models. Coefficients vary a little when estimating by
Poisson rather than NB. Plot 3 compares graphically model predictions and count observed
distribution. Robustness of estimations are still confirmed. The graph displays predictions of
NB and Poisson models, and either fit well the observed data.
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Plot 3 – Comparison of Prediction Models and Observed Distribution
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7. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the suppliers’ performance in the MEPA.
The regression analysis supports some basic intuitions about the direction of effects of the
variables influencing suppliers’ performance. Location, revenue and loyalty play a relevant
role in explaining success. More successful firms appear those located in the North, having
large revenue in the MEPA, and interacting with a selected pool of purchasing
administrations. Quite surprisingly, success varies with the supplier’s size in a direction that is
not in favour of the most represented group suppliers. Micro suppliers appear less successful
than all other suppliers. Micro suppliers is awarded a limited number of RFQs in relation to
the number of times bidding occurs. Among all other suppliers, small, medium and large
suppliers show similar patterns of performance.
Our paper is the first step to understand what is driving suppliers’ success in the MEPA, and
in general, what could be at the root of suppliers’ performance in MEPA-like marketplaces. A
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full analysis of this issue can be important for providing policy indications to market makers
and marketing insights to suppliers for business/selling strategies.
One point worth highlighting is that the increase of suppliers’ base constantly over time might
not be sufficient to achieve well developed and functioning e-procurement platforms if
contracts end up awarded to a very restricted pool of suppliers. Potential concerns may arise if
part of this phenomenon relates to factors other than suppliers’ efficiency or ability to satisfy
buyers’ needs, as local favouritism. One adverse consequence could be the early exit of some
suppliers that may lower the level of competition in the future.
Further research will extend the analysis of performance to account for these and other factors
that we are aware may play a role in explaining suppliers’ success in the MEPA. For instance,
investigating whether success is driven by efficiency rather than favouritism would help the
market maker but also competing supplier in understanding more on the real the nature of
success.
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